Wireless networks of low-power sensing devices are poised to become a ubiquitous part of the computing landscape. Proposed applications of these networks range from health care to warfare. The challenge for the information security community is to develop the common security services (confidentiality, integrity, etc.) for sensor networks in a manner that meets the very strict resource constraints of these devices. This forum will describe a broad range of on-going research efforts in order to acquaint the general information security community with the issues and concerns of sensor net security.
Overview
The emergence of low-power sensor networking has been propelled by the convergence of advances in several fields, including nano-technology, Micro Electronic Mechanical Systems (MEMS), radio frequency communications, and microprocessors. These research efforts are culminating in programs such as the UC Berkeley "Smart Dust" project, which recently announced a sensor/transceiver chip called Spec just 5 mm 2 in size and requiring one thousand times less power than a conventional cell phone [1] . Ad hoc networks of such miniaturized sensor/transceiver units create a powerful tool for information gathering. These networks may include relatively more powerful base stations or relay points that serve to connect the sensor network to the outside world. In other instances, the sensor nodes themselves serve as dynamic relay points. Current commercial sensor/transceiver devices from companies such as Crossbow, Dust, Ember, and Sensicast Systems provide custom communication stacks and the beginning of hardware support for symmetric encryption. Efficient key management, minimizing use of communication and computation, remains a critical challenge.
Security research for sensor networks takes several forms:
• New, more efficient cryptographic algorithms and security protocols. Efficient versions of public key cryptography (such as the NTRU algorithms [2] ) and broadcast authentication protocols (such as µTESLA [3] ) have been devised.
• Asymmetric algorithms and protocols.
Security services have been designed to place the primary computational and communication burden on external entities and/or relay devices rather than on sensor nodes.
• Integration of security into applications.
The computing infrastructure of miniaturized devices is often much flatter than conventional devices, avoiding layers of networking protocols and application functionality for performance reasons. This approach requires security to be deployed at higher abstraction levels, since a generic security service is too costly.
• Limited acceptance of vulnerabilities.
Sensor net security services have been designed to accept specific vulnerabilities when they are compatible with application goals and provide performance advantages. Examples are reduced computational rounds in symmetric encryption computation and key management protocols that rely on an initially unauthenticated message.
The forum participates will describe their own efforts to create and deploy security services in ad hoc networking environments and their vision for the future.
Forum Participants
The follow individuals are expected to participate in the forum session. 
David Carman is a Principal

